Motivating Science Students by Acknowledging the Uncertainty of Certainties by Mc Elhiney, David Stanley
Title of Stud:r: HO?lv.A'i'I!m. SCL1IfilE S'11UDmfi'S 
UWC&1TilHTY QlI' CEB.TATI\rl'TI::S 
Major Field: Ua:tu.ral SCience 
Scope of S'c.udiJ: Jrr the days of .A.-Fistotle:, acience w:a.s conr:iide:red to be 
nearly s;ynonomous 1rit.h phi.losopl:iy; indeed -!c,he pl':d.:LosopJ:~e:rs tre:re 
the only ones 1iho ir1dulged tn .a11y form of scien.cci besides thoso 
11r10 p1'ac-tioocl the black art or so.rie f'or.11 01' witchcrn.t't. Them wher1 
science is said to have come into its own, science .rod philosoph;sr 
<l:rii:'ted fart.her· end f c,.r-'c.her apart, vntil {,l1ey· i:J:.('.!!"8 consido1'1Gd to be 
entirely :incorn.i')a't.ible. We are now a-t the ·threshold of a ncu· e::·ra, 
as sc:ienee l'.n.d philosopJi:;t are clrfaw.i.ng closer together age.in~ tie 
hear it so.id now that one cannot be a 02.~a:c.ivo scientist unless he 
possesses a c·uJ.tivated ir:1z,.ginrction; th:::t those scientists who pm::-
sue obsel~rations and. logic a.1--e co:nster1t1y plag11.:id 11:ract,s n u:1:1.ch 
they ::.'eiuse to disr-ogi:u.""Cl. liaterieJ.G :f'.or this st.u~r, were chosen 
pr:11nar·ny frorrL Journals and per:Lodiccl.s i:n ·which n:citers 1rere con-
cen1od w:U,h the dile1UJ71a and inconsi.stm:1cy .in uh:i.ch scie11t.ists find 
thetaselvcs at t,ir10s. Many of these ideas 1.''€n'e acc·:c1rrr1.1.lo:ted from t,he 
rnca.1y re,11ro'ks of ny colleagues .:-,nd profecsors trith this tr.ei tor has 
lti.scussed these p:r·oblens. 
F:i:.l1dine;s and Grn1cJ.usioz1s: It seems, 't,hat very lit,i,le of this ne1-r thouglrt 
cmc}Ol"ni.ng tl.'1e merging science an.d philcsophy, has d:t=l:ft.ctl :i11to 
the classroo:.,20 of our elementa..7, junior high, .::i.nd h.igh schools. 
It would seem or.J.y ns:;;t·m·al tha.t rnan:r of "those studezrts uould lilte to 
}:.now of this reeapit;u.lation taking pla.co. Porhr.;,s they could be 
motivated into SCiiilC seriouo considerations of tho defii.'1:Ltions .o.r1d 
the premJ1aptions of science.. They cou.ld ve-x·y o.1Sily re thriJJ.ed. 
t.o realize t.hat science 1-Iith cll of" it,s accomplisbmen·ts cou...ld be 
considered to be i.11 u di..1e1:,1na. The7 c:o;JJ.d be 1;1ystifiod to the pQint, 
of mve, uhen con.front,cd 1-rit.h the suJgestim that ccmn1on sense is not 
the same s.lJ logic and that tho latt,cr iE ne:rol;'f & nw,tter or hc,bit, 
education or co~.,1'.mnicati.0i1. Th01.;·e ai"e instances :i11 all br21'.lches and 
at all levels of science uhen. thece 1m<:ert.~inties c.:)11 be 11errc.:i.cned 
i.r.lth good possib:ilitior:3 of mo';:;ivation .. 
MOTIVATING SCIENCE STUDEI\TTS BY ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF CERTAINTIES 
By 
DAVID STANLEY MC EI.HINEY 
Pachelor of Science 
Northwestern state College 
Alva, Oklahoma 
1949 




submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of 
the Oklahoma State University in partial 
ful.fillment o.f the requirements 
for the dsgree of 
¥!ASTER OF SCIENCE 
May, 1958 
MOTIVATING SCIENCE STUDENTS BY ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF CERTAINTIES 
RBport Approved: 
7 D9an of the Graduate School 
ii 
PREF AGE 
Though this is by no means a unique observation with me, there are 
in all fields of science and mathematics, basic theories about which the 
experts disagree. In many situations, this disagreement is so pronounced 
that it seems as though there is no absolute truth, at least the line 
between truth and untruth is ver-y- wide and fuzzy. The greatest certainty 
we have is that we will always have uncertainties which is in itself some-
1-mat reassuring to a student of science. It is my plan to develop an 
area of motivation that is very often forgotten or at least neglected. 
This attempt shall be directed pr:unarily at the superior student 'Who at 
t:unes may feel that everything has already been discovered. 
Indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. James H. Zant, National Science 
Folllldation Institute Director, for his assist8nce in this report; and to 
the staff in the library where many of the ideas in this paper ~rere se-
cured and developed. 
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Though the problem today is not as great as it was a few years ago, 
there is a tendency on the part of many science and matheinatics teachers 
to give their student,s the impression that they are living in a world of 
well established facts, the truth of which need never be questioned. 
These teachers, like our juvenile delinquents, can not be ·purdened -with 
all the blame. Perhaps it is because of our .American way of life, but 
very often anything in pr:fnt is considered to be the truth. We are 
greatly i-ndebted to our country and its forefathers, for the respect we 
can have for printed material, but in science where so much emphasis is 
placed on facts, the truth should not be considered lightly, e~-pecially 
when truth itself is so abstract. 
At any rate, the teacher may be the victim of "pr:i.nti tis II and leave 
the students with exactly the same impression as that created by the 
textbook. To some, this textbook impression is to be desired, and to those 
this problem is not real. However, it is to this same group that this 
discussion will be most applicable, and is therefore most directed. 
This country has long been knovm for its mass production and its 
ability to apply aJJnost any theory, but it has never been exceptionally 
known for its creativity. We a.:re a country of Edisons, and can take 
an idea and malce it practical. This aptitude for development is exceed-
ingly commendable, and has made our nat:i on the greatest the world has 
1 
2 
ever lmown, but just now the eyes of this world are looking to this coun-
try to "pull something out of the hat 11 so to speak. They have long ago 
been impressed with the number of our automobiles, television: sets and 
automatic washers, but now they want a new theory of matter for example. 
To promote this theory development, many of our lai~ge industries 
get their top scientists together for llpipe dreamn sessions. In these 
meetings, the research men will listen to anything that anyone is capable 
of conceiving, ±'rom the educated calculations of their top engineers 
to the lay observations of the janitor, and fantastic schemes found in 
the suggestion box. They have little doubt as to their ability to build 
the project, if they can just get the idea. 
So how do we produce creative scientists? T'nis is our goal, our 
primary objective. Certainly a way not to produce them is to permit 
complacency and mass satisfaction to rule our classrooms. If our studen·t;s 
constantly leave the classrooms with the feeling that documentary material 
is sufficient, if they are constantly reminded of what scientists do know 
with never an occasional hint at what they· don't know, if textbook impres-
sions are the only motivating device, the few creative scientists produced 
by this system will be produced in spite of the formal educational ex-
perience, and not because of it. 
Much has been written condeming scientists for their 01,m. self-right-
ousness and conceit, and much has also been said about their humility. 
Many philosophers think that scientists must define the terms with 1-mich 
they work before they can proceed and still oth~rs defend the neglect of 
this practice as perfectly reasonable. Science teachers at all educational 
levels are becoming more and more aware of our increasing uncertainties 
but to this w·.citer 1s lmowledgc, very little has been done with these 
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uncerta...i.nties as a. mea.ns of motivating a class or in pc1rticular the super-
ior indi vidua1. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate several of these basic 
1-mcertai.nties as a means of motivation, thereby shovrlng students that 
science is not a matter of cold hard facts, that have been previously 
digested. The method ·will be to separate science into several of its 
fields in which severa1 uncertainties will be discussed in each section, 
and one section will contah1 considerable discussion on scientific phil-
osophy in general. 
CHAPTER II 
SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY 
In the da~rs of _4.;ristotle, science was considered to be nearly the 
same thing as philosophy; indeed the philosophers were the only ones who 
indulged in wy form of science besides those who practiced the 11black 
art 11 or some form of witchcraft. Then when science is said to have come 
i.nto its own, science and philosophy drifted farther and farther apart, 
u.ntil they were considered to be entirely incompatible. Philospphy still 
continued to dwell in abstractions but science, the "great science", delt 
only with truths and realities. We are now at the threshold of a new era, 
as science and philosophy are drawing closer and closer together again. 
We hear it said now that one cannot be a creative scientist unless he 
possesses a cultivated imagination,. that those scientists who pursue obser-
vations and logic are constantly plagued by nfacts II which they refuse to 
disregard. 
Very little of this new thought has drifted into the classrooms of 
our elementary, ju.nior high, and high schools, and it would only seem 
natural that many of these students would like to know of this recapit-
ulation taking place, and perhaps they could be motivated into some serious 
considerations of the definitions a.'1.d the presumptions of science. They 
couldJ very easily be thrilled to realize that science with all of its 
accomplishments could be considered to be in a dilemma. They could be 
mystified to the point of awe, lmen confronted with the suggestion that 
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co:rrnnon sense is not the same as logic and that the latter is merely a 
matter of habit, education or corm1mnica"Gion. 
Its Presumptions and Iefini tions 
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'\liihen asked if there are ai1y beliefs that are presupposed by science, 
the answer seems to be that such beliefs are not properly required for 
the carr;y-ing on of science, but that they are needed for its justifi-
cation. This basic distinction between acting and justifying ones actions 
runs through the entire pat:tern of ht1.man behavior. One may act without 
at the moment being able to state the pr,nciple directing his actions, 
or he may enjoy a painting Ki.thout at the time being able to give a good 
reason for the basis of his appreciation. Similarily one may pursue truth 
without being able either to define truth or to state what conditions rrmst 
be satisfied by nature and by man if truth is to be obtained. In terms 
of om~ problem, this means that science may, for relatively long periods 
of time, go on its merry way, without requiring any examination of pre-
suppositions or assumption; furthenr10re, science seems in general to be 
none the worse for this fact. In this sense there are no beliefs that 
are presupposed by science and the insista;:ce on the part of certain phil-
osophers that the scientists must uncover ai_"").d make peace 1-1ith his pre-
suppositions seems somewhat mispla.ced. He can justifiably reply that 
science has been doing very well, thank you, without this kind of energy, 
and the prospects seems not too bad for the future. 
This argmnent seems all very i-mll but if left entirely alm\e, one 
might properly ass1-une that nothing needs defining. Indeed there are 
those who advocate this im thod of education - that is, never to make a 
formal definition as such but by clriH and use the definition becomes 
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emplanted without the individual being aware of it. Certainly this would 
at times become very frustrating to the student, for if he were aware that 
he was taught in this manner he might reasonably say that no question need 
be answered on the spot. Rather, let us toy with it and perhaps its mean-
ing will rub off, and suddenly we will all see the light. 
Sir Isaac Newton was a God-fearing man, and a humble one. Ironically, 
the scientific revolution, which his discoveries :il1itiated, gave birth to 
generations of proud theorists who were confident that they could solve 
everything in the lmiverse by a rigid attention to the great scientific laws 
of Newton and his successors. The belief in the world as a "great machine, n 
eminently lmowable, was buttressed by the successive brilliant discoveries 
like Faraday's research into electricity, Darwin's theory of evolution and 
Mendeleev's periodic table of chemical elements. Down in the twentieth 
century, it made the average scientists seem rather uppity. 
In the United States, especially, the dogma of science was widely 
enforced. nscience tells us 11 became the favorite lead-off of the bill-
board and the radio commercial. In universities as well as advertising 
agencies, the authority of scientists have an almost theological warrenty 
at a time when theology was froi-med on. Small wonder that this sterotype 
of the domin.eering scientist became an object of some resentment by laymen. 
The atom destroyed this idea of scientific omnipotence. The dis-
coveries of atomic science forever toppled the confident certa:LY1ty of the 
ugreat machine 11 vie-wpoint as surely as Newton and Copernicus ripped to 
shreds the physical science of .Aristotle. It forced scientists to super-
impose a whole new complex set of rules a..Yld observations on top of their 
old Newtoniru.1 physics, for Newi:;on I s laws did not apply to the peculiar 
movement of the atom world. 
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This idea of our scientific limitations has been very well expressed 
by one of the foremost scientists of our time, James Robert Oppenheimer. 
Jl1 an address entitled 11Science and Common Understanding II he said in part: 
TuTe are, of course, an ignorant lot. Even the best of us know how to 
do only a very few things well; and of what is available in knowledge of 
fact, whether of science or of history, only the smallest part is in 
any one man I s know.ing. The notion of universal knowledge has always 
been an illusion. We are not today tempted to search for keys that un-
lock the whole of human knowledge and of man's experience. - - .11.nd this 
is the mitiga.nt of our ignorance ••• although we are sure not to lmow 
everything and rather likely not to lmow very much, we can lmow anything 
that is known to man and may, with luck and sweat, even find out some 
things that have not before been lmow to him. This possibility is one 
of the manifestations of our belief in equality, that belief which could 
perhaps better be described as a comraitment to unparalleled diversity 
and unevenness in the distribution of atta:imnents, knowledge, talent, 
and power.l 
The widespread conception of philosophy and science as radically 
:independent fields of inquiry is of relat,ively recent origin. Less 
than two centuries ago, it was usually assumed that at least pa.rt of phil-
osophy's task was to analyze the structure and assumptions of the sciences, 
and thereby to make explicit the nature of lmowledge and of the pervasive 
features of the universe. The late divorce between philosophy and science 
was due to a number of factors, one being the influence of a powerful 
tradition. It was supposed, even by some of the great masters of science, 
that the proper objects of knowledge must be truths which are capable 
of being established with complete certainty. It gradually became apparent, 
ho~rever, that knowledge obtained by scientific methods does not conform 
to these specifications. It was not easy for most men to emancipate 
lJames Robert Oppenheimer, Science and Common Understanding" 
Newm-1eek, June 14, 1954, p 71 
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themselves from the old tradition; many were persuaded that what could 
not be achieved by science could be attained through philosophy. In 
short, the view became fashionable, especially m Germany, that pli.ilos-
ophy had a privileged access to ult:imate truth, and that it could achieve 
a more profound understanding of things by turning its l:ack on science. 
Philosophy was thus reputed to be the exclusive quest for the eternal 
and the certain. Indeed, many philosophers acquired quite a contempt 
for painstaldng logical analysis, and produced speculative systems of 
the world that possessed imaginative and emotional appeal but found litt,le 
support in empirical inquiry. Philosophy also frequently served as a 
defense for the intellectual and social status quo. 
The above arguments are acknowledged in a book by Hans Reichenbach, 
"The Rise of Scientific Philosophy." 2 The book is divided into two parts; 
the first is a critique of the assumption, that there are truths - that is, 
true propositions about the world which can be established by reason 
alone. The second and larger part of the book claims to show that with 
the help of modern tools of logical analysis, and when due heed is given 
to the findings and procedures of the empirical sciences, a number of 
outstanding issues in the theory of lmowledge and the philosopby of na-
ture can be definitely solved. Its author has, therefore, written a 
vigorous plea for an end to the unfortunate divorce of philosophy and 
science. 
What can perhaps be safely said is that scientific philosophy finds 
no comprehensive plan controlling the operations of nature; that is, it 
2Ha;ns Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, University 
of California Press, 1951 
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attacks problems in a piecemeal fashion and eschews all attempts at a 
wholesale solution of nature's secrets; and that its standard of reason-
ing and conpetent evidence are those which obtain in the varied empirical 
sciences. 
Modern science aims at generality, and at the same time it seeks to 
provide dependable guides for the intellectual. But the actual evidence 
for its laJim and theories is never complete and there is no &,-uarantee 
that the guidBs will function successfully in the future. 
So what theories should we believe? We must admit that theories 
must be made if there is ever any progress and that perhaps some of the 
terms in the theories need to be defined. Do we need to decide whether 
or not a theory has value before 1-ro accept it? If it is necessary to 
make a value decision to have a science before we can have one, then this 
decision is literally prescientific a..n.d has not, therefore, been shovm to 
be any part of the procedures of science. Simi1arily, the decision that 
one problem is more worth-while as a focus of attention than another is 
an extra decision ax1d forms no part of the proced1,u~es involved in dealing 
with the problem decided upon. Since it is these procedures that con-
stitute the method science, the value judgment has not thus been sho1-m 
to be involved in the scientific method as such. The perfect scientist does 
not ailow this kind of value judgment to influence his work, just as a per-
fect father does not ask if his being a father has any value, nor a perfect 
lover does not ask if his loving has any value. For the same reason a 
so called perfect grouche does not ask if his griping has any value . 
.Among scientists it is taken for granted that a theory should be 
accepted if aJ1d only if it is 11true. n To be true means in this sense, 
to be in agreement with the observable facts that can be logically 
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derived from the theory. Every influence of moral, religious, or politi-
cal considerations upon the acceptance of a theory is regarded as "ille-
gitimate II by the so-called 11comrmmity of scientists." This view certain-
ly has had a highly salutary effect upon the evolution of science as a 
human activity. It tells the truth - but not the whole truth. It has 
never happened that all the conclusions dra'Wll from a theory have agreed 
with the observable facts. The scientific community has accepted theories 
only 1-m.en a vast number of facts has been derived from few and s:i.mple 
principles. 
If we restrict our attention to the two criterions that are called 
"%crreement ·wit..h. observation" and "simplicity, 11 we remain completely within 
the domain of activities that are cultivated and approved by the commun-
ity of scientists. There is obviously no theory that agrees with all 
observations and no theory that has "perfect 11 simplicity. Therefore, in 
every individual case, one has to make a choice of a theory by a compro-
mise between both criterions. However, when we try to specify the degree 
of simplicity in different theories, we soon notice that attempts of this 
kind lead us far beyond the limits of physical science. 
In his latest book "What is Science?"3 Mr. James R. NeV11-:man sets the 
volume I s tone when he concludes that we must look to man and to science 
itself for a happy issue from the momentious problems which its prcgress 
has posed for mankind. He then goes from one essay to another which 
include a challenging assortment of facts and ideas, for example : Axioms, 
which troubled men so long because they were thought to be self-evident 
truths, are now recognized as nothing but assumptions. To be good, a 
3Ja;mes R. Ne1~nan, What is Science~ University of Chicago Press, 1955 
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theory must be c·apable of disproof. It leads to new exper:i.Jnents and these, 
in turn, test the merit of the theory. The scientist works in two en-
tirely distinct worlds - that of facts and that of interpretation and 
creative imagination. Scientists can profit by bei.l1.g more humble in the 
face of their irmnense ignorance, by a frank admission of awe and admir-
ation for the great beauty of the things they study. 
ITS DILEMMA 
There is present in this country, symptoms of a growing distrust 
of science and scientists. The problem or dilemma is indicated by a nlunber 
of phrases and statements (some only approximate quotations) "Which have 
appeared in speeches, articles, and books, particularly during recent 
months. 
"Science is a conflict; w.i. th society •.. Science has failed ..•• Science 
is charged with some, if not most of the failures, violence, brutalities, 
suffering and confusion of our times •••• There is a growing a..11.Y,.iety to 
minimize and localize science .•.• Science is tolerated only on its best 
behavior ••.• It has become a passion and a 1UJ.."1ll'y •••• A sacred cow .••. A 
cult of men in white coats ...• Its revelations have been considered alien 
to the hu:man spirit ••.• rt will destroy civilization .••• There is a steady 
increase in irrational.ism, unscientific and antiscientific attitudes of 
mind •••. Scientists are valuable but untrustworthy •••• There is a widespread 
tendency in the public mi1"'.d to identify science with destruction .••• 
Science must not be permitted to go on a rampage .•.• Scie,ce is respected 
for its power; not for its spirit .••. Horal incompetency of science ••.. A 
revulsion against science is said to be in the making •••• Disappointment 
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and suspicion enshroud science ..•• Hovering over science are storm clouds 
of suspicion, recrimination and fear .... There is abunda,.'1t evidence to in-
dicate a serious decline in the popularity of science and scientists dur-
ing the past few years .••• Scientj_sts have been more pushed about by U.S. 
security regulations than any other group in our society •..• 'routing for 
precious freedom, scientists are really speaking of permissive freedom 
exemption from legal restraint in pursuit of knowledge .••• Let I s demand 
a moratorium on science. 11 
This is only a small sample of e2cpressions vJhich apparently reflect 
attitudes now in ascendance. The trend may be insignificant, transitory, 
or even imaginary; or it may be very real and serious. Irreparable da.:mage 
may be done before it is apparent. Of course, critics of science have 
always been with us and science from its beginning has contended 1tJ:i.th these 
attitudes. The contemporary c::iticism, however, while exhibiting the sa;me 
ibin.orance and lack of tmderstanding, is arising in nei-J and powerful quar-
ters, is aj.med at our basic philosophy, a.YJ.d appears to be building up 
to the point where the 11si;1s of sciencen is a popular topic of conver-
sation. 
F1igh school science students like to discuss such things as these -
in fact, some of their most delightful experiences in the classroom come 
from what they thought was a complete aba..ridonment from the lesson. They 
may even have felt that the class got clear awa:-y- from the teacher when 
actually it could have and should have been under his direction all the 
time. Here is listed some of the causes of the adverse development in 
the field of science, each of which could easily be used for a topic of 
discussion in the classroom: 
1. The concept that science and religion are in opposing c~nps -
suspicion that science is largely responsible for whatever degree of 
abandonment there has been of moral principles and ethical standards. 
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2. The internationalistic outlook of scientists - misunderstanding 
of the scientific philosophy of free exchange of information. 
3. Social neutrality of science - the detachment and indifference 
of scientists to public attitudes - the practice that some scientists 
have of setting themselves apart, above, and beyond the rest of society. 
4. The ridicule of areas of lmowledge not subject to precise measure-
ment, the disagreement among scientists themselves as to what can l:l git-
itimately be considered nscientific. n 
5. The time lag between the views held by scientists and public 
awareness of such views. 
6. Fear and resentment of the 11destructive 11 poi:rer of science. 
7. Disappointment in the wake of the exaggerated hopes penned by 
excited newspaper and magazine writers . 
8. The extraordinary scientific illiteracy in .AJ:nerica even among 
intelligent, educated people - ignorance of the basic precepts without 
which there would be no science at all. 
The situation demands further study of causes and solutions. Science 
needs no special pleaders, but respect is a necessity and can come only 
with understanding. Scientists are dependent upon society for their pri-
vileges and it behoves them, no matter how ma;.1y years it may talce, to 
conmn.micate a more accurate conception of science to as mai,y people as 
possible. 
Here it seems, lies something of value. We know full well that our 
entire class will not be creative scientists, and while we must do all 
that is humanly possible to motivate those who might possibly have superior 
ability, we must not create an aversion to science for the others. Though 
these slow learners need not climb the house tops to plead the cause of 
science, they need respect for science, 1'11hich as stated can come only 
with understancting. 
Many times scientists feel that they are surrounded with a public 
opinion by which scientists are described as secret sorcerers who, in 
closed laboratories, conjure up bigger and better methods of destruction. 
Everyone who has had any real contact with scie11ce or scientists lmows 
well that this picture of science is highly misleacting. 
Sir Richard Gregory:, the late editor of "Nature" said: "Science is 
one of the great hur112n endeavours to be ranked with art and religion as the 
guide and expression of man's fearless quests for truth. 11 
Dr • .A. V. Hill, in an address entitled nTJ:ie Ethical Dilemma of Science" 
defends this situation as follows: 
It is clearly our duty as citizens to see that science is used for 
the benefit of mankind. For of v-lhat U3 e is science if man does not sur-
vive. It has been debated whether "the scientific mind11 is fundamentally 
amoral. TJ:ie real answer is that there is no such thing as the 11scientific 
mind. 11 Scientists, for the most part, are quite ordinary folks. In their 
particular scientific jobs, they have developed a habit of critical exam-
ination, but this does ,-: ot save them from 1rdshful thinking in ordinary 
affairs, or sometimes even from misrepresentation and falsehood when their 
emotions or prejudicies are strongly enough moved. Their minds are no 
more amoral than those of surgeons, lawyers, or scholars. As investiga-
tors, most of them realize that their function wou..ld be satisfied were 
they to introduce moral data into scientific argument. So scientific 
people, like all good citizens, must take account of ethical consider-
ations and chief among these are integrity, courage, and good-will. 
Integrity forbids them to aJ_low feelings of any kind to obscure facts, 
but that does not make4them amoral. After all, integrity is the first 
condition of morality. 
4 A. V. Hill, "The Ethical Dilemma of Science n, Vital Speeches 18 :617 
Many times the student in the classroom may loose sight of the 
value of his texbook material. He may feel that it is so far removed 
from the things that are taking place in the world, that he is wasting 
his time learning basic science and answers to elementary questions. 
Perhaps he needs to consider briefly that industry is now, more than 
ever, luring and tempting the upure n scientist. The change is part of 
the gradually emerging new pattern of Jhnerican industrial technology. 
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In the past, industrial researchers - as distinguished from long-hairs -
concentrated on improving products. They worked by the rule book of 
existing knowledge; they were content if things happened, to be ignorant 
of the essential reason for the happening. Today, that is no longer 
enough. Technology has exhausted the existing canon of lmowledge, both 
experimental and theoretical. From now on, pure science is needed to 
unlock the door to newer and better products. 
There are several reasons why the elementary questions must be 
answered. E:urope is petering out as a fountain of pure science • We 
no longer have the material for all our ideas. Most of all, the insights 
into natural phenomina, produced by pure science, have hatched the me-
chanical wonders of today. But scientists say these are mere indications 
of what can be done. Industrialists gleefully watch their Ph.D's pry 
away at the why of things, and excitedly wonder at the "gee-whiz 11 ideas 
that lie behind the doors their scientists will open. 
There are those writers who have gone so far to express fear that 
physical science may not survive. This may seem very ridiculous in the 
light of all recent publicity, but there are some sensible points that 
can be mentioned. 
Dre s the fact that we are said to live in the age oi' science mean 
that the method of physical science has penetrated into the thinking 
habits of the average citizen? .Anyone who answers this in the affirma-
tive must be prepared to expJ.ain many curious and highly publicized 
phenomina of very recent date, among them "dianetics, u miscellaneous 
miracles, 11 and the renewed controversy over dowsing, not to mention 
business as usual by the astrologers and the spiritualists. 
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There have been cranks in all ages, and in a free society there is 
certa:inly a place for them. They undoubtedly have a definite contribu-
tion to make to civilization: They amuse some people and stimulate 
others to useful ideas; occasionally they make money. Perhaps cranks 
should not be attacked as such, but what seems deplorable is that a very 
large segment of the educated public appears unable to distinguish a 
crank from a scientist. In spite of our vaunted educationaJ_ system, it 
is all too clear that to most elements of the population, scientists 
are merely people who collect facts about all sorts of queer things and 
then use the facts to make all kinds of materials and gagets. 
One of the characteristics of scientists and of other professional 
individuals for that matter, which most men in the street find exasper-
ating, is the habit of mainta:ining a judic~ous bala...'1ce about most questions 
under discussion, instead of coming right out with dogmatic emphasis and 
say-1..Tlg nThis is so, and make no mistaJrn about it. 11 Of course if scientists 
were to taJ{e this positive attitude, they could be made to look like 
fools on so many counts that this same man in the street would loose 
complete faith in h:im; this is a worse fate than mere exasperation. At 
axw rate, there is no question of the dilermna which also appears to be 
ge-t,ting more complex. 
Perhaps the most striking fact about modern science, in its explorations, 
ranging from the heart of the atom to frontiers of the universe, is 
that, like poetry, like philosophy, it reveals depths and mysteries 
beyond, and quite difJ'erent from the ordinary matter-of-fact world we 
are used to. Science has given back to the universe that quality of 
:inexhaustible richness and tmexpectedness and wonder which at one time 
it seemed to have talrnn a.way. 
17 
We can cla:iJn science to be one of the most complex and far-ranging 
of our mental experiences. At aEy one moment we may have only a pre-
carious hold on a temporary truth, and our consciousness of this ever 
urges us to seek fresh truths a.11.d new understandings. The pursuit of 
science presents to the human mind an endurjng challenge on an endless 
frontier, quite apart from the material enrichment of mankind to which 
it may incideictally give rise. iAf3 Nobel Prize-11Tinner, Sir Edward Apple-
ton, Principal of the University of Ed:.i.nburgh said, 11If art for art I s 
sake is a desirable slogan, why not science for science's sake?" 
So despite the :iJnmense technological successes of science in our 
t~ue, we must admit that there has been a widespread dissatisfaction. 
One has accused modern science for its emphasis on the material aspect 
of the world and for diverting the mmd of modern man from human and 
spiritual mterests. The humanities have developed almost segregated 
from the sciences. Philosophy, the key to the humanities, has become an 
isolated depa.rtment, without much bearmg upon the m:ind of present day 
scientists. An attempt has been made by many science groups for some 
:i.lnprovement of this vnsatisfactory situation b-ff discuss:ing in a strictly 
scientific way, possible bridges between the natural a.nd the social sci-
ences, between the sciences a.nd the humanities. Such bridges cannot be 
built 1,,Jithout some elements of common language and without a mjnimum of 
common philosophy. 
18 
One common problem discussed is "Reasons for the acceptance of 
scientific theories" because, :in the solution of this problem, not onJ.y 
results of purely scientific research are :involved, but equally consid-
erations from the fields of social studies and the hirraanities, particu-
larly from the philosophy of science. Some have stressed the point that 
in the physical sciences a general theory, such as the theory of relativ-
ity, is not accepted on the ground of mere agreement of its results with 
observed facts. The theory should also be simple, :in agreement wlth 
common sense, 1r1ith prevaili.Ylg philosophies and should allow an i..n.terpre-
tation of the universe that can be used to support a desirable way of 
life. Since nm1e of these requests can be completely met by a theory, 
the actual acceptance has always been in effect, a compromise . 
In this competition for the role of sense makers to a bewildered 
hur11anity., some feel that the scientists are loosing out. Hot thnt people 
do not want to be i:·,.structed by science, they have never been more eager 
for whatever guidance it can give. People stand reverently before its 
theories, lis-i:.ening hard, trying most earnestly to understand. But what 
they hear is ever less intelligible. They have acquired a great deal 
of scientific i.nformation, more than laymen have ever bef'ore known, but 
they have at best, only a vc1nishi.ng gl:i.rnm.er of an idea of what this 
information means. 
Scientists t,hemsel ves are hardly any better off. So far has scien-
tific specilization gone thP.t only the most selected can hope to 11.11der-
stand the refinements of each specialist's work. Today there are few 
scholars who can call th0r11sel ves mathematicians or physicists or biolo-
gists 1r1i thout restriction. A man may be a topologist or an acoustician 
or a coleopterist. He will be filled with the knowledge of his ftLeld, and 
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will know all its literature, all its ramifications, but more frequently 
than not, he will regard the next subject as belonging to his colleague 
three doors down the corridor and will consider any interest in it on his 
oi;m part as an unware.ntable breach of privacy. The criteria for disting-
uishing sense from nonsense, have to a large extent been lost. Our minds 
are ready to tolerate any statement., no matter how ricliculous it obviously 
is, if only it comBs from a man of repute. If this state of mind exists 
among men of science, ·what will be the state of . mind of a public, taught 
to measure the value of an idBa :L11 terms of its incomprehensibility? 
What then do -we tell our students in our classrooms? Do -we overlook 
this dilemma and stick to the absolute facts in the textbooks? Certainly 
that would be the easy way, but if this is the way -we choose to take, 
out goes one of the possibilities for motivation. On the other hand, 
do we mention this dilemma at the start of each class? Do we constantly 
indicate that because there are a few poi..11.ts about which we are uncertain., 
that this is coLclus:i.ve evidence that we must the ref ore be uncertain 
about all points? Obviously this would lead to mass frustration, and 
these discussions should be reserved for those rare t:ilnes when by some 
sixth sense you realize an opportunity to thrill a student or a class. 
Its Communication 
Cormnunication has become an irksome, two-pronged problem for the 
scientist. On the one ha,_d, he finds it increasingly difficult to keep 
abreast of the work in his 01vn and allied fields. On the other., he sees 
an ever-widening gulf separating h:iJn from the public. Ex:panding research 
programs yield data at an accelerating rate, yet the scientist 1s reading 
and retention rates are limited physiological and psychological factors. 
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A biochemist observed recently, 11If I kept up i;-n.th all the work 
being done in the narrow field of antibiotics alone, I would have no time 
left for research. As it is, I em buried under a mountain of papers, 
and reports." 
Perhaps this problem of communication vd.th the scientist and the 
public and vrl_thin scientific groups, is also a problem w"ith the science 
teacher. Certainly he is expected to keep up with developments in a 
very vast field, but if he cannot communicate, his cause is lost. 
Fortunately, scientists realize the seriousness of this bottleneck, 
and undoubtedly it will be removed before it stra..n.gles scientific work. 
Scientific language, with its mathematical symbolism, is universal. 
Consequently, the problem is one of engineering. Once a met.hod is set up 
by which information can be abstracted at various levels of complexity, 
recorded, cross-indexed in efficient research pathways, and made available 
in easily accessible form, the scientist will no longer need to flounder 
through unnecessary data to find what he needs. Increased reading effi-
ciency will enable him to keep informed of developments. 
But the problem of communication between the scientists and the 
public has no such obvious solution. The scientist is changing the world 
about us. His work is vital to our health, security, and prosperity. 
Yet to the average layman the work and the language of scienc~ are as 
mysterious as the witch doctor's 11m11mbo-jumbo 11 is to the savage. The pace 
of scientific discovery has left the layman far behind, and the few inter-
preters of science too frequently speak a language he does not understand. 
In today's world, there is great popular respect for the scientist 
as a technician but there is great popular skepticism concerning the 
ability of the scientist in the areas of politics and social organization. 
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When one comes to jntemational affairs, the scientist's deeply embedded 
sense of fraternity c1mong those who seek knowledge in the same field of 
investigation, regardless of their nationality, is al.most certain to eJs.'})ose 
him to the charge that he is nsoftn in his thinkillg about the United 
States and other nations. This low appraiseJ. of the scientist as a cit-
izen is 2n important aspect of the anti-irrtellectualism that today appears 
aJ.l too cannnonly in the climate of public opinion. It has been encouraged 
and strengt,hened by conservative politicians and demagogues who say to 
the scientist, in effect: 11Contillue your research. !linprove the m.ach:inery. 
Design new gadgets, and create more powerful weapons. But stick to your 
laboratories. We will determine how, and for what purpose, all these 
things shc1ll be used in practical everyday life. 11 
CH.APTER III 
UNCERTAINTIES IN LIFE 
Perhaps the most promisi.Ylg area for uncertainties cont:Lrming to 
be such, is that area in which life itself is a part. The poet and 
the philosopher have long been writing and JGalldng about its mysteries, 
and it seems that when the scientist attempts to talk about life by way 
of definition, he is talking as a poet. We know, of course, that scientists 
know a vast amount of things about life - they know the conditions under 
which life can exist., or at least life as we knmf it, can exist. They can 
itemize these conditions in nice pretty order, and yet there is always 
some sneaky individual that does not fit. They have attempted to divide 
life into two kingdoms., the plant and animal. Yet, there is a group 
called the flagellates that seem to fit in both or perhaps neither. In 
nearly all these distinctions about which the experts have attempted to 
be precise, there is not a sharp clean line of dj:vision, but rather a 
broad fuzzy line. 
The scientist cannot adequately def:i.J.,e life or, at least, not as well 
as the poet. .Aristotle, who 1;,re must call a scientist, perhaps gave some 
of the best definitions of these abstractions. He said an animal was an 
animal because of its animal soul, and a vegetable was such because of 
its vegetable soul. A man was therefore the highest because he possessed 
the most higJ:i.ly developed soul. Certainly no one could argue 11tlth this 
definition., but 'What exactly does it tell us? Ou.t' modern scientists can 
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at least give us something more useful even though it might not be quite 
as truthful or philosophical. 
With the failure of so many exper:L~enta1 efforts to find the secret 
of life, science was left in the half embarrassing position of having to 
postulate theories of living origins which it could not demonstrate • 
.After havL."'lg chided the theologist for his reliance on myth and miracle, 
science found itself in the unenviable position of having to create an 
mythology of its o~n1; nmnely, the assumption that what, after long effort, 
cou.ld not be proved to talce place today had, in truth, taken place in the 
primeval past. 
The use of the term mythology is perhaps a liti,le harsh. One does 
occasionally observe, however, a tendency for the begilliling zoological 
textbook to take the unwary reader by a hop, skip, and jump from the 
little steaming pond or the beneficent chemical crucible of the sea, in-
to the lower world of life wit,h such sureness and rapidity that it is 
easy to assume that there is no mystery about this matter at all, or, 
if there is, it is a very little one. 
This attitude has indeed been she.rply criticized by the disting-
uished British biologist Woodger, who remarked some years ago: 11Unstable 
organic compounds and chlorophyll corpuscles do not persist or come into 
e:i-..'"istence in nature on their 01-m account at the present day, and consequently 
it is necessary to postulate that conditions were once such that this did 
happen although and in spite of the fact that our knowledge of nature 
does not give us any warrent of making suc..h. a supposition. 11 It is a simple 
dogmatism asserting that what you want to believe did in fact happen. 
Yet toda;y- there are theories of all deno:mjnations that constantly 
plague us. We cannot of course completely disregard these theories 
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for though our doubt may be justified, complete refusal to listen is not. 
Dr. George Wald of Harvard, firmly believes that if you start ·with a 
universe containing protons, neutrons, and electricity, life, that -will 
pursue evolution, will eventually appear. There have been experiments 
that do suggest that perhaps a billion years or so ago, repeated bolts 
of lightning forced basic chemicals in the atmosphere into a coincidental 
merger. Simple substances ,;:rere combined into more complex assemblages. 
Anrlno acids, proteins, and other biological build:i.ng blocks were formed. 
Further experiments have led the biologists to conclude that the world's 
biologic8l chain reactions could have started with volcanic eruptions: 
Lava, hitting the ocean at a propitious time in the earths geological 
evolution, could have heated sea water to temperature suitable for chemical 
blending. Sooner or later, Dr. Wald is sure life will begin on rory planet 
like the earth (of which there are probably billions). 
Many scientists think that life appeared on earth when the atmos-
phere, jnstead of being its present m:ixture of oc ygen, nitrogen and carbon 
dior;de, conta:ined methane, ammonia and hydrogen. These ingredients, 
still to be_ found :in the atmospheres of Jupiter and Saturn, slowly com-
bined :into larger and larger organic molecules, accord:ing to the hypo-
thesis. At last one molecule, a complex protein, showed the ability to 
absorb other molecules and create replicas of itself. 
When Nobel Prize-winner, Harold Urey, elaborated on this theory last 
year, he said that one of his students was checking it eA'J)erimentally. 
Graduate Student, Stanley L. JY'dller, 23, told h<JW he had s:i.Jn.ulated condi-
tions on a pr:i.m.iti ve earth and created out of its atmospheric gases several 
organic compounds that are close to proteins. I1:i.ller se-t, up a closed 
apparatus contajning water, methane, ammonia and hydrogen. When the 
water was heated, its va:por circulated the other gases past a small elec-
tric discharge, ,iThich promoted chemical reactions among their molecules. 
This sort of thing may have happened on the primitive earth, where light-
ning was probably comm.on. In any case, the influence of the electric dis-
charge was s:imilar to that of the strong soJar radiat:Lon bee.ting down 
on the top of the prjJni ti ve atmosphere. 
\vb.en the apparatus of Hiller I s had run for a day, the water grew 
pinkish, and then turned red. .After a week, Student VJiller analyzed the 
mixt,ure. It proved to contain at least three an1J.no acids (glycine, alpha-
alanine a.i.'1d bet-alm1.ine). This was the hoped for payoff: .Amino acids 
are the building blocks of which protei.ris are made. 
P-.cofessor Urey and Student Miller do not believe they have created 
life • What they have done is to prove that complex organic compounds 
found j_n living matter can be forf!led by chemical reactions, out of the 
gases that were probably co1Tu11on :iJ.1 the earth• s first atmosphere. If their 
apparatus had been as big as the ocean, rmd if it had worked for a million 
years instead of one week, it might have created something like the first 
living molecule. 
From experiments such as these merrtioned, most biologists believe 
that life developed in a this soup of orga.Dic compounds dissolved in an 
ancient sea. Today the seas contain no such stuff; if any is formed it 
is at once destroyed by living organisms. But in the days WJ1en ·there were 
no such organisms, molecules of sugar, proteins, etc,, might have existed 
indefinitely, an.d where two of them ca;ne together they might join to forrn 
a large molecule. Eventually, so goes the theory, a la:cger complicated 
molecule was formed tha.t could grow by absorbing neighboring molecules 
and could also reproduce itself. 
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Grow-th and reprodJ..1ction are earmarks of life. But the biologists 
ask, did the seas before the beginning of life really contaj.n org8.niC com-
pounds? If so, where did they come from? Scientists have dissolved a 
little ferrous sulphate and CO2 in pure water enclosed in a specially 
designed glass cell and exposed it to high energy helium ion beams from 
a clyclotron. Analysis showed that a little of the co2 combined with 
water to produce formic acid and formaldehyde. Scientists have long knmm 
that solutions of formaldehyde some ti.mes turn into sugar. 
There were no clyclotrons, of course, when the earth W8E young and 
lifeless, but the ocean probably contained co2 and a variety of other 
inorganic chemicals. High energy radiation from cosmic rays and other 
sources might have :iln.pregnated this virgin solution as it does today. 
It seems quite possible that it created formaldehyde. Then i.YJ. a million 
years or so, this s:iln.ple stuff may have turned into sugars, proteins and 
at last into living particles. 
Then there are those who think life may li..ave begun on earth as a 
mist of tiny organisms, or a "biological aeroso1,n high in the atmosphere, 
rather than in steamy primeval seas; Heinz Hager, of the U. S. Air Force 
Department of Space I1edicine thinks life may exist today in that form 
on Venus, thought by many astronomers to be lifeless. Haber further 
thinks it possible that life attempts to gajn a first foothold on planets 
w:Lthin their at.uospheres in the form of these biological aerosols. There, 
life becomes a major factor in the development of the chemical consti-
tution of planetary atmospheres. As a consequence, the living matter 
alters gradually its chemical and thermal environment by changing the at-
mosphere1s constitution, its absorptive qualities regarding solar energy, 
8nd its proper radiation, until life may finally succeed in developing 
explosively. 
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According to this concept, life does not depend entirely on the 
chm1ces of the creation of a suitable environment effected through in-
organic processes on the surface and within the atmosphere of a planet. 
Instead, life itself invades a planet and attempts to form an enriron-
:ment favorable for extensive development. In the light of this concept, 
Venus and Earth can be considered as presently be:mg in different stages 
of development. 
A mystery that has fascinated philosophers for thousands of years is 
how a complete organism develops out of a single fertilized egg cell. 
The biologists can disturb fertilized ova in all sorts of ways, but they 
cannot explain how the apparently simple cell can, all by itself, construct 
something as complicated as a whale or a man. A man 1 s body starts as a 
single fertilized cell. Somewhere along the way it is arranged that 
certai..n of the cells arising from this common ancestor cell develop spe-
cialized characteristics and become nerve cells; certa:in others become 
liver cel1s, while still others develop into the cells of fi..ngernails, 
hair, muscle, connective tissue, and so on. How does this specialization 
take place? Here, surely, is a deep problem which is at the very core 
of biological science. 
CHAPTER IV 
UNCERTAINTIES IN PHYSICS 
1'1lhat has happened to the relative tidy picture nhich we all had, 
not too many years ago, of a physical world built from only a couple 
of elementary particles? What sort of a de1:imma are we headed for, when 
the munber of elerneritary particles now stands at perhaps twenty-five, 
and still tends to :increase? Is it possible that these elementary par-
ticles have become neither elementary nor particles? 
We have to admit that our conception of material reality today is 
more wavering and uncertain than it has been :f:or a long time. ~ know 
a great many :interesting details, and learn new ones every week. But 
to construct a clear easily comprehensible picture on which all physi-
cists would agree is simply impossible. Physics sta.11.ds at a grave crisis 
of ideas. However, the optimists among us look upon this view as a 
philosophical extravagance born of despair. We hope that the present 
fluctuations of t:hinking are only indications of an upheaval of old 
beliefs which in the end will lead to something better than the mess of 
formulas which today surrounds our subject. 
In spite of our optomism, we must agree that the basic questions 
are giving the physicists trouble. Matter, for example, is comm.on stuff, 
but the scientists do not know what matter is. The more they dig into the 
problem, the more coni'used they get. Dr. Erwin Schrodinger, Nobel Prize-
winner in physics, points out that light, cai."J. behave as waves and also as 
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particles. So can electrons, protons and larger chunk:s of matter. 
11A limited volume of gas, say helium, n he admits, 11can oo thought 
of as either a collection of many helium atoms or as a matter of waves. 11 
~ the same k:iJ.1d.s of reasoning, a desk, a battleship, or even Dr. Schro-
dinger himself may be merely a fuss kicked up by conflicting waves. But 
Dr. Schrodinger is not sure of even this wild idea. He adraits that neither 
he nor anyone else can answer the question. nwhat is matter?n 
Wh~t holds the nucleus together? Electrical forces bind the elec-
tron to the atom, but they cause nuclear particles to fly apart. The 
powerful cohesion of protons and neutrons mu.st be explained by a wholly 
different phenomenon. In the past quarter cent,ury, physicists have devoted 
a huge amount of experimentation and mental labor to this problem -· 
probably more man-hours than have been given to any other scientific 
question in the history of mankind. The problem is not only fundamental 
but alien to our experience. ~J all the lrovs of knavm forces, the parti-
cles in an atom's nucleus should flee from one another, instead of cling-
ing together so strongly that we must build enormously energetic machines 
to pry them apart. The glue that holds the nucleus together must be a 
kind of force utterly different from any we yet know. 
Dr. Hans A. B:ithe, head theoretical physicist in the war-time atom-
bomb project, is baffled by this force and says trying to explain the 
structure of atoms without understanding this mysterious bjnding force, 
is like figuring out the rules of a baseball game without seeing the ball. 
However, he has :faint hopes for he thinks the bi,,ding force has sometb.Lng 
to do with mesons, and knowledge of the elusive particles is accumulating 
rapidly. 
'Where do cosmic rays come from? How do these particles attain 
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their awesome energy? They have told us much about the nature of the 
nucleus, and they promise to tell more about the universe. The earth is 
under a ceaseless rain of particles from space. These cosmic rays, our 
only material contact with the vast universe outside our planetary system, 
have excited wonder and eager study ever since they were discovered forty-
sL"C years ago. They fall upon us with energies far beyond anything that 
can be produced on earth. They shatter the atoms of matter and make their 
nuclei explode into strange fragments. It is the iEvestigation of cosmic 
rays that has been responsible for the discovery of so many new ele...rnenta.ry 
particles in the past quarter-century. :EBsides this, cosmic rays are of 
great interest in biology, for by producing mutations in genes they are 
said to ha:ve played, and continue to play, a large role in the evolution 
of life on the earth. Thus, cosmic rays have been very useful to science, 
but the big question remains: Ml.ere do they come from, and how do they 
get their fantastic energ,J? 
Professor Bruno Rossi of M.I.T., a leading authority on the subject, 
seems- to favor, tentatively, the theory that the cosmic ray particles 
were shot out of stars at moderate speed and were gradually accelerated 
by magnetic fields in space. But he is by no means sure. "At present, 11 
he says, uno hypothesis about the origin of cosmic rays is unequivocally 
supported by theory of experiment. n 
.Another great mystery of space is why the galaxies often look like 
spinning pinwheels. Cecilj_a H. Payne-Ga.poschkin of Harvard Observatory 
has no ready answer. She points out that a great many galaxies including 
the earths, are spirals, but she does not know how they got that way. 
It may have something to do with the turbulence.and viscosity of the th:in 
gases between the stars, or with the magnetic fields that are supposed to 
permeate space. Astronomers believe that the explanation of the mysterious 
spirals will tell them much about the history of the universe. 
Some of the uncertainties in physics have been exceptionally well 
discussed by Norman E. Nelson in an article written for the Yale Review 
entitled nscience and the Irresponsible Irnagination: 11 
Those of us who have not died are getting old, and what is more sig-
nificant, these ideas of our flaming youth are getting on i_11 years and 
ought to settle down and act their age. This in my opinion, they are not 
doing, and the popularizers still ride the magazine circuit, and in one 
field especially, I have noticed that the 1rJiseacres are almost never 
challenged or heckled. In the space-tjme continum that Professor Einstein 
ruies as his domain, there are few indeed who dare to raise their heads 
and ask inquiringly about tJ:1em. 
When I read the popularized physics of our present decade, I am 
compelled to recall the 'twenties' and my own uneasy bemusement which 
cuJ.Jninated when I read 11The Nature of the Physical World. 11 Therein, 
Eddington said, or seamed to say, that an iron bar is at one and the same 
time of different lengths according to the way its atoms are distributed 
by the magnetic field surrounding it, that magnetic field being determined 
not by where the bar is but by where it is observed fr~n - the lonely 
platforms circling in space, each with a scientist peering through his 
telescope and jotting dmm his calculations. Since Eddington was ac-
lmowledged even by his grim fellow scientists to be the Lord Bishop of 
the physical universe, and since I was do1'm by the effort; to c anprehend 
him, I succumbed to his style. 
Edmngton was no mere popu_larizer and I do not visualize myself as 
reducing hirn to confusion in debate. My quarrel is with myself for be-
lieving what I did not understand, and as time goes on, with semi-scientific 
popularizers who disseminate what they clearly do not understand. Time 
shouJ_d have brought a sifting of the first extravagant conjectures and 
a reassertion of the human right to examine what we are asked to believe. 
Time has brought no such thing. Because some awesome speculations have 
exploded convincingly in the middle of the Pacific, few of us a.re rash 
enough to qu.ibble about anything bearing the label of the new physics.l 
Mr. Nelson then continues at length concerning the 1-&terary liber-
ties that are talcen in science and mathematics. _lifter quite a discourse 
on mathematics, he returns to physics. 
But the fun that the literary mystagogue has with arithmetic is 
nothing to what is possible when he begins taking liberties with the 
lNorman E. Nelson, "Science and the Irresponsible I.rnagination" 
~ Review, September 1954, pp 71-88 
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laws of physics. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is the aJ1nost 
universal misunderstanding of the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy. 
Like many great scientific discoveries, including Galileo's epica.1 account 
of falling bodies and of missile trajectories, this pr:inciple is popu-
larly mistaken to be the direct expression of experimental observation, 
but in fact it is a rational inference from an unobserved universal assump-
tion to an unobservable universal conc·1usion. Heisenberg wanted to trace 
the path and note the speed of electrons rnoVing within the atom. He found 
that the only way one can pin-point an electron for observation is by 
catching it in a beam of light of very shortest wave length, therefore of 
the ver-;[ highest frequency, therefore, alas, of such violent force as to 
J.oggle the very electron one is tryi.ng to observe, altering both its speed 
and its direction. His conclusion, the Heisenberg principle, is that 
,;re shall never be able e:x:peri1nentally to find out precisely what the elec-
trons are doing and will have to be content with a statisticaJ. estimate 
of probability as to their carryings-on. The presumption is unavoidable 
if unacknowledged that there is regularity if we could only detect it. 
Scientists have learned to operate with statistical probability sjnce 
that, is all they can get, but there is no reason why the universe has 
to conform to the limits of scientific information. Yet popular expo-
sitions of Einstein's universe and even articles in the 11Scientific Mon-
thlyt1 explicitely assert the capricious irregularity of the universe on 
the authority of Heisenberg.2 
The literary freedom referred to by Mr. Nelson might well be applied 
to authors of high school textbooks as well as the ,;vri ters of articles in 
scientific journals. Y1r. Nelson is obviously very upset by the way new 
thGories are accepted and the same tjJ11e, the old theories are still used, 
even though they are obsolete in the face of the new theory. He constantly 
selects parts of the theory of relativity upon which to:_!prove his points. 
Much as it may upset us, we cannot dismiss as mere bogey the dis-
quieting results of the :t-'lichelson-Moreley experiment, ,;-,hich proved that 
a beam of light travels just as fast with, as it does against or across 
the earth's motion through space. This constancy of the speed of light 
is the firm foundation of all relativj_ty theory, but it is a very upset-
ting constancy. If the speed of light is unaffected by the speed of the 
object it takes off from and by the speed of its recipient, the light is 
ver-y constant indeed bu.t everything else is bewilderingly i11constant . 
.Although physicists do not attempt to explain why this is so, and have 
not yet shown how light defies the ground rules, nevertheless they have 
been able to obtain greater verifiable accuracy jn their calculations 
~Ibid 
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by using this theory than by rejecting it. Without pretending to resolve 
these perplexities I should like to reassure the man in the street and to 
mitigate the delicious vertigo of the literar-y relativist by remarking 
that neither the light-beam nor the earth are traveling at more than one 
speed whatever speed that may be. If they irere, all bets and calculations 
would be off. The relativity is not in the speeds themselves but in the 
relationship between them - somehow.3 
Then Mr. Nelson comments on the way scientific men w.rite about the 
conditions of space travel and the many things which may be encountered 
if and when space travel is here. 
Our :imaginative friends are not content to be earth bound and let 
the light-rays do the moving about. They long to launch themselves in 
rockets 1-ihizzing so fast that their clocks and hearts will :imperceptibly 
slow dovm, thus extending their youth and lives. I have no wish to dis-
pute Einstein's theory on this point; I do, however, protest the careless 
rapture with 1-Jhich it is exploited in literary circles and not merely in 
l:imericks about the young lady who set out one day in a relative way and 
returned the previous night. On the authoity of Harvard scientists he 
assured us that two men, leaving the earth at the same instant in different 
rockets might return either one before the other, or (triumphantly) each 
before the other. Since the physicist sitting next to me made no protest 
beyond a subdued gToan, the arg,:m1ent went unchallenged. How could anyone 
be certified insane, or sane for that matter in such a universe? We 
academics are so conscious of our historic role as ene.mies of new talent 
and new insights that we dare not challenge a..11.y folly that corn.es to us in 




UNCERTAINTIBS IN CHEMISTRY 
One could hardly point to a chapter heading in a chemistry text, 
without bringing up a great number of uncertainties. The very basis of 
inorganic chemistry, which we incidently consider to be basic of the 
entire chemistry field, includes an elaborate study of the atom and the 
molecule. Yet it is certain (if the word certain is permissible) that 
the ox:;.rgen atom looks no more like the wa:y i;ve draw it structurally, than 
the word 11horse 11 looks like the animal for which it stands. It seems 
only fair to inform our students that all this tjJne we spend lea..."'Iling 
the structural formu._la of atoms and molecules is not to get us acquainted 
with how they look. We lmow of course that they do have value in expla:in-
ing reactions, the formations of compounds, etc. 
Of course there are radicals on both sides of the arg-urnent. We can 
read articles now that there is no such things as "bonding" in the com-
pound:J3, and that 11ionfuzation11 is mere fantasy. The important thing it 
seems, for the student, is to recognize that these theories do work most 
of the time, that they are ver1J useful, but at the same time they may be 
replaced. Dr. Hans Reichenbach, :in his book "The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy, 11 is not concerned exclusively with the issues in the theory 
of knowledge end argues for the vlew that the lar,rs of nature fo:rmulate 
merely statistical regularities and express on.ly relations of "proba-
bility implication. n Indeed he ma:intains that the notion of 11strict 
34 
35 
causalityn not only must, be aba11doned for subatomic processes but even 
for macroscopic events it is at best only an idealization or s:implification 
of what actually occurs. Moreover since the 11unobservable 11 constituents 
of subatomic physics and chemistry alleged_ly possess ncausally anomalous 11 
properties, he believes that the notion of "corporeal subst211ce 11 is not 
adequate for describing physical reality in this sector of inquiry. On 
the otherhax1d, he claims that the familiar but not causai wave-p2rticle 
interpretation of this reality can be avoided by adopting a ne-w three-
v2iue d logic, which he says must acl:mi t 11uncertajnty11 in addition to truth 
an.cl falsity as a possible value for a statement. 
Perhaps one area that this idea of uncertainty could be illustrated 
to the high school chemistry class, is in the discussion of catalysts. 
There are a lot of thi -r1gs we tell students about catalysts or catalytic 
agents. We say they do not initiate the reaction, yet there are isolated 
instances where they apparantly do. We say they do not enter into the re-
action, yet in some highly controled organic reactions ·!:,here was less cat-
alyst at the end of the reaction than at the beginning. This story seems 
to indicate mruiy qualities of the catalyt.ic agent. 
A certain 1u~ab had three sons, who at his death wished to divide 
his 17 cc=imels among his sons by giving half to the oldest, a third to 
the second oldest, a.nd a nineth to the youngest. The s:i.. tuation seemed 
:impossible lmtil the oldest agreed to add a camel from his 01:m herd to 
make the division possible 'without killing ai1;T camels. From the now 18 
camels, the oldest received 9, the second 6, and the youngest 2, The 
oldest then took back his 11catalytic agentn and everybody was happy. 
There are areas in chemistry which we consider daily, that stop 
the experts from even developing much thoory. Danish Biochemist Kaj 
Ulr:ik Linderstrom-Lang pays his baffled respects to the proteins, of 
which all living objects are largely made. Living cells, even simple 
bacteria, malrn proteins by the dozens, but hur11an chemists so far have 
36 
not s;;rnthesized any. The proteh1s I molecules probably have long central 
chains of mnino acids. These are coiled like springs, and all sorts 
of chemical oddments must be attached at precisely the right turns of 
spiraling chaJ11s. Progress thus far is not impressive, and until chemists 
have mastered the proteins I secrets, they cannot lmderstand how much chem-
istry in life re ally works. 
C1l4.PTER VI 
UNCERTAINTIES 111 MATHEH.ATICS 
Modern mathematics has given us aJ.1 entire raft of fantastic things 
about which we can taJJr and about which we can, for our purpose here list 
with the other llllcertainties. We hear now that one plus one may equal 
one or any other thing we may want it to. We are told that a straight line 
may no longer be the shortest dista."lce between two points. Our impression 
of these developments can probably best be expressed by Hr. Helson again. 
If I am asked in the name of science or mathematics to accept these 
ilnaginative decors as sober accounts of the reality I live in, I have the 
usual right to self-protection and may sift the poetic statements for 
truth on my own responsibility. When for exarn.plo, I aJn assured by my 
aesthetic acquaintances that a straight line is no longer, under Einstein, 
the shortest distance between two points, I have a right to ask them to 
point me out a shorter. The shortest distar1ce between points on a spher-
ical surface is the straight line through the circle, what ever the surface 
distance may be. The Riema1Lri surface often used to dL inch their argument 
turns out to be a mathematicion I s construct, with a strictly theoretical 
barrier between the points. Still more frequently cited is the fact that 
light-rays, like ever;ything else in a gravitational field, travel in a 
curve. But however sorry one may be for the light having to go around, 
it is difficult to see how that alters the distance between the poiI1ts. 
Of course, if our literary minds confuse the 1.mqua.lified with the nego-
tiable distance they can malce the 1.miverse out to be as queer as they 
like - and they do lilrn • 1 
Of course many of the interesting things that occur in mathematics 
which confuse people and yet m.ust be sjJnple are age old. Iror exern.ple, 
we have been told in our youth, that if a person could cover half the 
distar1ce across the room in one step and the remainiri.g half in one step 
lNorman E. Nelson, 11Science a11cl the Irresponsible Imagination" 
Yale Review, ,September 1954, pp 71-88 
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and so on, that he would never cross the room. Such arguments as these 
are discussed very- beautifully by Mr. Nelson 
When Zeno first pointed out the rift in the universe, life and thought 
were less complex. According to his teaching, a tortoise with a head start 
on Achilles wou..1d always maintain a slight or at least an infinitesimal 
lead, s:ince he would always be covering some distan.ce while Achilles was 
catching up to where he had just been. It took mathematicians allnost 
two thousand years to catch up with Zeno and solve the problem by the 
differential calculus. But in the s:i1llple ancient days it was always 
comforti..~gly possible for anyone to pass a tortoise if there was one 
about. Today the man in the street must set out at fantastic speeds 
over uni..rnag5nable distances in several directions at once in order to 
detect whether there is or is not a discrepancy so slight that even a 
tax collector would disregard it. In such circumstances the man in the 
street prudently keeps his mouth shut and waits for the experts to give 
him the answer. 
Dostoievske was, I believe, the first to announce 1·:rl th calm effron-
tery that whereas two plus two equals four is an interesting proposition, 
the proposition two plus two equals five is equally or even more so. 
These people havG, lwwever, received some ap::arent support fr0i11 philos-
ophers. Whitehead stuns the reader with this problem: One plus one 
equals two, but suppose they are drops of water. 11'Jhat then? The reader• s 
sanity, reeling from this blow, may recover itself by reflecting on 
Whitehead Is valuable distinction between the world of experience and th.e 
system of abstract s;ymbols convenient for scientists. Of course tl;ro 
plus two makes four, though that does not explain fusion or fission arry 
more than the mu..1tiplication table accounts for the propagation of the 
species.2 
Dr. Reichenbach in his book 11The Rise of Scientific Philosophy" 
devotes two chapters to the status of geometry, in which the belief that 
it is a system of truth that is sho~m. Geometry is a body of truth only 
as a branch of deductive mathematics, its asserted statements being then 
s:i1llply theo:i:0 ems of pure logic possessi..n.g no empirical content. On the 
other hand, geometry as a branch of physics is a set of contingent state-
ments and can be asserted o:nly on the basis of experimental evidence. 
Moreover, the statements of deductive geometry- do not refer to anything 
in particular, and expressions like "line II and "congruent II must first be 
2Ibid 
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interpreted in terms of physical configurations and processes before a 
geometric statement can be assumed to have factual content. Such inter-
pretations are a species of definition; they are neither true nor false, 
but are decisions as to how language is to be used. Failure to recognize 
the need for such definitions in this or other branches of inquiry is still 
a potent sourer! of belief in the synthetic truth. 
The fact that mathematics is no longer the stronghold of intuition 
is very well discussed by Dr. Hans Hahn. 
We have grmm so accustomed to the revolutionary nature of modern 
science that any theory which affronts connnon sense is apt to be regard-
ed today as haJ..f proved by that very fact. In the language of science 
and philosophy the word for comrnon sense is intuition - it relates to 
that which is directly sensed or apprehended. Twentieth-century discover-
ies have dealt harshly with our intuitive beliefs about the physical world. 
The one area that is comrnonly supposed to remain a stronghold of intui-
tion is mathematics. The Pythagorean theorem is still in pretty good 
shape; the self-evident truths of mathematics are in the ma:in still true. 
Yet the fact is that even in mathematics intuition has been taldng a 
beatjng. Cornered by paradoxes - logical contradictions - arising from 
old intuitive concepts, modern mathematicians have been forced to reform 
their thinking and to step out on the uncertain footing of' radically new 
premises. 
One of the outstanding events :in the banisl1ment of intuition from geo-
metry was the discovery that, in apparent contradiction to what had pre-
viously been accepted as intuitively certain, there are curves that possess 
no tangent at any point, or what amounts to the same thing, that it is 
possible to :imagine a po:int moving :in such a manner that at no instant 
does it have a definite velocity. The questions involved here directly 
effect the fom1dations for the differential calculus as developed by 
Newton and Leibnitz. 
Lest it be supposed that :intuition fails only in the more complex 
branches of mathematics, I propose now to exa1nine a failure in the ele-
nientary branches. At the very threshold of geometry lies the concept 
of the curve; everyone believes that he has an intuitively clear notion 
of what a curve is. We say that curves are geometric figures generated 
by the motion of a point yet it is not difficult to prove that this curye 
cannot be generated by the motion of a point, for no motion of a point is 
conceivable that would carry it through all the poi..11.ts of a wave curve :in 
a f:ini te t:i.Jne. 
Repeatedly we have fom1d that in geometric questions, even in very 
si.i11ple and elementary ones, intuition is a wholly unreliable guide. And 
it is of course :impossible to adopt t,bis discredited aj_d as the basis of' 
a mathematical discipline. The same reaction occured when the theory 
that the earth is a sphere was advanced. The hypothesis was widely 
rejected on the g-.counds that the existence of the antipodes were contrary 
to intuition; however, we have got used to the conception and today it no 
longer occurs to anyone to pronounce it :impossible because it conflicts 
with intuition. We can clearly see hmv concepts whose application is 
familiar to us acquire an intuitive status which is denied to those whose 
application is unf arn.iliar. The concept of 11weight II is so much a part of 
cormnon experience that almost everyone regards it an intuitive. The 
concept ''moment of inertia, n however, does not enter into most people• s 
activities and is therefore not regarded by them as intuitive; yet among 
many experimental physicists and engineers, who constantly work with it, 
moment of inertia possesses an intuitive atatus equal to that generally 
accorded the concept of weight. 
If the use of multidimensional and non-Euclidean geometries for the 
ordering of our experience continues to pr01e itself so that we become 
more and more accustomed to dealing with these logical constructs; if they 
penetrate into the curriculum of the schools_; if we, so to speak, learn 
them at our mothers knee as we now learn three dimensional Euclidean geo-
metry then it Will no longer occur to anyone to say that these geometries 
are contrary to intuition. They will be considered as deserv:ing of ·in-
tuitive status as three dimensional Euclidean geametry is today. For it 
is not true, as Kant urges, that intuition is a pure means of knowledge. 
Rather it is force of habit rooted in psychological inertia.3 
The arguments presented here by Mr. B.alm are much more conf orting 
than those of Mr. Nelson, whose arguments border on the point of ridicule. 
Even though each argument may strike our fancy more at one time than at 
another, we must admit that each vie-wpoint seems to have value. For ex-
ronple, again giving it to the mathematician is Mr. Nelson: 
If ever I am lured, quaking, aboard a space ship, it will be on the 
promise to take me, not just for a spin and back, but to the well-lmown 
point where parallel lines meet. I have gro1rm so skeptical of that Ul tima 
Thule that I should :insist on reaching out from the porthole to touch the 
exact spot. Mathematicians have a way of talking about infinity as a limit 
as a straight line is the limit of circularity - just because such limits 
are, like the square root of minus one, convenient in their work. The 
mathematiciaµ as such doesn rt care two pins whether actual lines actually 
meet or not.4 
3Hans Hahn, "Geometry and Intuition" Scientific .American, .April 1954 
4Nor.man E. Nelson, "Science and the Irresponsible Thlagination" 
Yale Review, September 19.54, pp 71-78 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
There has been at attempt in the preceedings pages to develop an 
area of motivation. It is not impossible to imagine that these uncer-
ta:inties could be overworked, so caution must be observed. Not that 
they resemble a.n. explosive substance, but that present:ing too many, too 
often, to the wrong group, could conceivable motivate :in reverse. Jm 
attempt has been made to present both sides of the question. B3cause 
we cannot be certa:in about everything, and even though more of our old 
certitudes are disappearing, does not mean that we cannot be certain about 
anyth:ing. On the other hand, because u,lS can be certa:in about some things 
does by no means iraply that we shall very soon be certain about every-
thing. 
The whole o.f man's experience has demonstrated that the practical 
results required for tomorrow depend essentially on the 11ir1lpractical 11 
.free curiosity of today. Perhaps everything does not require a scientific 
explanation. At the level of sophomore science, and almost universally at 
the level of general public discourse, one explains sanething by describ-
j_n_g and analyz:ing it :in terms of more familiar experience. This norm.ally 
provides the illusion desired, for we seldom stop to think that the more 
familiar tenns themselves require explanation. "When one is talking at a 
fundamental level, hm.rever, explanation is a ver:1 different process. 
Familiarity ceases to be so useful, and the ma:in requirement of an e:x:pla-
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nation, at this basic level, are compactness and generality. If you have 
a very compact way of stating relationships among a wide range of things 
and events, then you may say that you have explained them. The explana-
tion need not be, and in fact almost surely is not, understandable in 
any ordinary sense. On the contrary, we must adjust ourselves to the 
notion that understandability, in this basic sense, is actually synony-
mous with conpactness and generality and that we cannot ask for more. 
Is relativism dangerous for the masses of manJ:::ind? W:mld children 
be ta:ught certitudes at the beginning and later taught to be uncertain? 
Or can they from the beginning be given the shifting answers of relativism? 
L:i1l1ited absolutism has an answer. Show them that for some questions 
we have answers that are certain a.11d for others 1r:re do not. The omission 
of an emphasis on the existence of some certitudes would result in two 
evils; a lack of exactness in knowledge and an absence of discipline and 
restraint in behavior, two evils which are not uncorrm1on in the products 
of modern education. 
Science reveals itself as a natural and integral part of man's whole 
life, an activity inn.ch at base, is a blend of logic, intuition, art 
and belief. It has been refined into an instrurnent of great beauty and 
precision by the few, but this science of the few is merely the distilla-
tion of the experience of the many • .AJ3 a natural social activity of' man, 
science belongs to all men. 
Benjamin, Cornelius A. 
MonthlY:, 73:150-3 
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